We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certi…ed for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as su¢ cient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with veri…able messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163-170] results to games with partial provability.
Introduction
Consider a Sender-Receiver message game: viz. costless, non-binding, faceto-face and one-step unilateral communication game played by an informed interested party (Sender) who sends a message on the basis of his payo¤-relevant information to a decision maker (Receiver) who then takes an action. When the set of Sender's available messages vary with his information, we say that some information is certi…able.
1 What conditions on players'preferences and certi…ability are required for the Sender to voluntary reveal his private information to the Receiver ? Said di¤erently, what conditions on players' preferences and message structure are necessary and/or su¢ cient for such a game to possess a separating equilibrium ?
The literature has addressed this question only for some speci…c certi…ability contexts.
In cheap-talk games the informed party can certify nothing of what he knows (formally, the message space does not depend on the realized type). In such a game, when the Receiver's ideal action (when fully informed) is unique in the Sender's type (e.g., Crawford and Sobel [5] ), full revelation occurs if and only if no Sender's type strictly prefers to be misidenti…ed for another. 2 When the Sender has the ability to certify both all his payo¤-relevant information as well as the fact that he is not withholding information (formally, by sending a particular message unavailable to any other type), Milgrom [18] , Grossman [12] and Grossman and Hart [13] have shown that under monotonic preferences 3 all information is revealed in every equilibrium. Existence of such an outcome requires the possibility for the Receiver to use a skeptical (or worst case) inference (i.e., to identify what is the least favorable information for the Sender, and to believe it when he detects or suspects that the Sender withholds piece of information). Seidmann and Winter [21] generalize these existence and uniqueness results by replacing monotonicity with preferences where both players'ideal action strictly increases with the Sender's type, and the bias (i.e., the di¤erence between the two players'ideal actions) either is strictly one-signed in the Sender's type (e.g., Crawford and Sobel [5] 4 ) or changes in the wrong direction. They also give a single-crossing property on more general preferences that guarantees the existence of a separating equilibrium.
Giovannoni and Seidmann [11] study a Sender-Receiver game where the certi…-ability is stronger: the Sender has the ability to prove any true event (formally, the Sender can certify all subset of types containing the realized one). They show that such a game possesses a separating equilibrium if and only if no pair of types strictly prefer to be misidenti…ed for another (Giovannoni and 2 Forges [7] is an example of cheap-talk game satisfying this condition and then possessing a separating equilibrium although players have con ‡icting preferences. , Example 7) is an example of cheap-talk game failing this condition but even so possessing a separating equilibrium (in mixed strategy) because the Receiver's ideal action is not unique in the Sender's type. 3 That is, each Sender's type wants the Receiver to believe that his type is as high (or as low) as possible. More precisely, the Receiver's optimal action increases with the Sender's type, and each Sender's type payo¤ is monotonic in the Receiver's action. 4 The one-signedness follows from their continuity assumption and their premise of Theorem 1.
Seidmann's single-crossing property).
While it seems reasonable to consider situations in which an informed agent can certify something, it is often unrealistic to assume that he has the ability to certify everything. The information transmission may be limited by time or technical constraints, the Receiver's ability to verify a proof, or the Sender's ability to prove all true payo¤-relevant facts or that he is not withholding others information. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [21] results to a setting of certi…ability that may be partial.
In a context of partial certi…ability, Lipman and Seppi [16] provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which full revelation takes place when there are multiple informed agents. They show that the Receiver can extract the information by adopting an inference rule that consists in believing any claim reported by a Sender unless refuted by another. The revelation relies on a competition between Senders with con ‡icting preferences and cannot apply with only one Sender.
We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on both players'preferences and information that can be certi…ed for the existence of a separating equilibrium. These conditions (Proposition 1) are …rst that every set of types that can be certi…ed has a worst case inference (Seidmann and Winter's [21] result). And second that every type can separate from all types that strictly prefer to be misidenti…ed as him. For preferences where the bias either is strictly onesigned in the Sender's type (as monotonic preferences) or changes in the wrong direction, we provide conditions on certi…ability that ensures existence and uniqueness of the separating equilibrium outcome. The existence condition is that every type can certify that it is at least as high (resp. as low) as it actually is when the Sender's ideal action exceeds (resp. is exceeded by) the Receiver's one. This holds even when contrary to Seidmann and Winter [21] , the Sender's ideal action does not increase with the Sender's type (Theorem 1). Uniqueness is guaranteed under the stronger condition that every type can certify a set only containing types for which it prefers to be misidenti…ed (Theorem 2). This last condition also ensures existence of a separating equilibrium under more general preferences satisfying Seidmann and Winter's [21] or Giovannoni and Seidmann's [11] single-crossing property (Theorem 3). Finally, we illustrate the use of our three theorems in an example.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model describing the general framework and some preliminary de…nitions. Results, example and applications are o¤ered in Section 3. All proofs have been relegated to an appendix at the end of the paper.
Model
A persuasion game, , is played by a Sender, S, who sends a message on the basis of his private information to a Receiver, R, who chooses an action after observing the message sent by S. Following Seidmann and Winter [21] , hereafter referred to as SW, we denote R's action space by A with generic element a. We assume this action set A is a compact interval in R. The Sender's private information or Sender's type, t, is realized from a compact interval R, with prior distribution p(t). Each player's payo¤ depends on R's action and S's type. We denote player i's state dependent payo¤ function, i = R; S, by u i (a; t) where u i ( ; t) is vN-M utility function for each type t 2 .
Preferences
We shall assume throughout that:
A1. Receiver Preferences: For each t 2 , u R ( ; t) is concave in a, and a R (t) := arg max a2A u R (a; t) is unique. Furthermore, a R ( ) is continuous and increasing in t on .
A2. Sender Preferences: For each t 2 , u S ( ; t) is strictly concave in a, and a S (t) := arg max a2A u S (a; t) is unique. Furthermore, a S ( ) is continuous in t on .
In A1 and A2, the action a i (t) 2 A denotes the unique maximand of u i ( ; t) on A, referring to i's "ideal action". 
Messages and certi…ability
The keystone of our analysis is that, contrary to SW we consider a certi…ability structure which may be partial. That is, S may be able to certify part of his information to R, but unable to certify all of the payo¤-relevant information he actually knows. For instance, an expert may present some certi…ed documents (as pro…ts earned, initial endowments, costs, physical proofs) supporting part of his private information to a decision maker, but even by transmitting all the documents he has, he cannot prove that he is not withholding additional documents.
An intrinsic certi…ability structure requires that the set of available messages depends on S's private information. We assume the set of available messages may be type-dependent (persuasion game). Let M (t) be the nonempty set of available messages to type t. Let M ( ) := [ t2 M (t) be the whole set of messages with generic element m, and M be the messages structure (that de…ne which information can be certi…ed) de…ned as the Cartesian product of the set of available messages on the set of types, i.e. M := t2 M (t). This structure thus de…nes the messages intrinsic certi…ability and is de…ned by the communication medium (presentation of documents, certi…ed information, etc...) between both parties. Let T (m) := ft 2 jm 2 M (t)g be the set of types t for which the message m is available. Thus, a message m certi…es that the realized type is in T (m) and rules out types in nT (m). We shall equivalently say that message m "veri…es", "certi…es"or "proves"the set T (m). A set T is "veri…able", "certi…able" or "provable" if there is a message m that certi…es T . We suppose that each certi…able set is closed. Write the game (M ) as fM; A; p; u R ; u S g. We shall analyze the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of (M ), which we refer to as its equilibria. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is particularly well adapted to our situation where a message can intrinsically carry some information on the realized type. In addition to Nash equilibrium it requires that R cannot ignore a proof or evidence transmitted by S. More precisely, on receipt of any message m (either on or o¤ the equilibrium path) R's updated belief must have support in T (m) the set of types for which m is available.
Our main objective is to characterize conditions which ensure the existence of an equilibrium in which all S's private information is revealed to R. We shall say that an equilibrium is fully revealing or separating if there is no identical 6 (M ) can be thought of as many signaling game in which payo¤s do not depend directly on messages. Crawford and Sobel [5] is an example of (M ) where only can be certi…ed (cheap-talk game), u i ( ; t) is strictly concave in a, and a i ( ) is C 1 and strictly increasing in t (in their example, a S (t) = a R (t) + b with b 2 R). Seidmann and Winter [21] is an example of (M ) where each t 2 is certi…able and a S ( ) is C 1 and strictly increasing in t. Giovannoni and Seidmann [11] consider a S-R game of persuasion where is …nite, every T is certi…able, a R ( ) is strictly increasing in t and u i ( ; t) is single-peaked in a.
message sent by two di¤erent types, so R always learns the true type and chooses a R (t) in response to each message transmitted by t, for every t 2 . We shall denote T min as min(t 2 T ) and T max as max(t 2 T ) for closed T .
De…nitions
Under a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, A1 implies that when receiving a message certifying a set T , R responds by choosing an action a R (t), where t can be chosen as an element of the convex hull of T , denoted as co(T ). We shall say such a type t is an inference for T .
Existence of a separating equilibrium requires that R plays a strategy giving S the incentive to reveal all his private information. To put such incentive in place, R must respond to each message available to type t, by an action getting to t a lower payo¤ than under action a R (t). Said di¤erently, having observed a message m, R must threaten S with an action a getting to type t, for any t 2 T (m), a lower payo¤ than under action a R (t). For this threat to be credible, it requires that action a can be supported by a rational inference. Such an inference is then called a skeptical inference or a worst case inference (wci). Formally, an inference t 2 co(T ) is said to be a worst case inference for
If t 2 wci(T ) and t 2 T then t is said to be a worst case type for T (wct(T )).
Results
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 3.1 provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the game to possess separating equilibrium. Section 3.2 uses these preliminary results to establish more tractable su¢ cient conditions when the game satis…es a given class of preferences that has been widely studied in the literature. For such preferences, Section 3.3 o¤ers su¢ cient conditions for every equilibrium to be separating. Section 3.4 provides su¢ cient conditions for separation under a more general class of preferences. Finally, Section 3.5 illustrates the use of all our results by an example.
Preliminary results
Under A1, by de…nition, if a certi…able set T has no wci then whatever R's inference t for T , there is a type t 2 T who strictly prefers a R (t ) rather than a R (t). The existence of a separating equilibrium under A1 then requires that every certi…able set has a wci. When every type is certi…able, SW has shown that this condition is also su¢ cient. Indeed, the separating strategies in which each type t sends his self-identifying message m (i:e:; such that T (m) = ftg) and R chooses an ideal action supported by a wci for each certi…ed set constitutes an equilibrium.
When dropping SW's assumption that every type is certi…able, even so full revelation may occur at equilibrium. For instance, consider a cheap-talk game of pure common-interest (a S (t) = a R (t) for every t) with more messages than types. However, the wci condition may not be su¢ cient to guarantee existence of a separating equilibrium. For instance, in Crawford and Sobel's [5] example only is certi…able and min is a wct for .
The existence of a separating equilibrium does not require that every type t can separate from all other types, but only from types that strictly prefer to be misidenti…ed as type t. In other words, it does not require that each type t can send a self-identifying message certifying the set T = ftg, but only that t can certify a set for which he is a wct. If each type is a wct for the set his separating message certi…es then no type has an incentive to deviate to messages on the equilibrium path. To ensure no pro…table deviation to messages o¤ the equilibrium path R must threaten by inferring a wci for any certi…ed set.
The following proposition states that under A1, (M ) possess separating equilibrium if and only if, roughly speaking: (i) R can play in a manner that every type t prefers the action a R (t) rather than any action induced by one of his available message; and (ii) every type t can separate from types that strictly prefer to be misidenti…ed as type t. Proposition 1. If A1, then (M ) possesses a separating equilibrium if and only if: (i) Every certi…able set has a wci; and (ii) Every type can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set for which he is a wct.
Condition (i) in Proposition 1 is the SW's necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium in games where every type is certi…able. This condition obviously holds if S's preferences are monotonic in R's action (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty [8] , Grossman [12] , Grossman and Hart [13] , Koessler [14] , Matthews and Postlewaite [17] , Milgrom [18] , Milgrom and Roberts [19] , Shin [22, 23] ), as for any certi…able set T either T min or T max is a wct.
Condition (ii) in Proposition 1 says that any type t must be able to send a message that certi…es a set not containing a type t 0 who would prefer a R (t) rather than a R (t 0 ). Of course, separation requires that such a message can be chosen di¤erently for any type. This condition always holds in persuasion games where every type t 2 is certi…able (e.g., Giovannoni and Seidmann [11] , Grossman [12] , Grossman and Hart [13] , Koessler [14] , Matthews and Postlewaite [17] , Milgrom [18] , Milgrom and Roberts [19] , Seidmann and Winter [21] ) since it is su¢ cient for type t to send his self-identifying message. Literature has examples of games where this condition fails. This is the case in Fishman and Hagerty [8] 7 since there is no enough messages, and Cheap-Talk games once there is a type that strictly prefers to be misidenti…ed for another (so this latter type is not a wct for the unique certi…able set ). In a situation where a type possessing more information than another one, can certify all what this latter can certify, condition (ii) requires that the former does not strictly prefer to be misidenti…ed as the latter. The failure of this explains the nonexistence of separating equilibrium in Shin [22, 23] .
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In the following, using Proposition 1 we shall state three theorems providing su¢ cient conditions for (M ) to possess a separating equilibrium (Theorem 1 and Theorem 3) and su¢ cient conditions for every equilibrium of (M ) to be separating (Theorem 2). Although the conditions we shall use to imply condition (i) and (ii) could not be treated independently, roughly speaking we shall label condition (a) referring to (i) and condition (b) referring to (ii). That is, condition denoted as (a) will refer to some su¢ cient conditions on players'preferences and condition denoted as (b) will refer to some su¢ cient conditions on the message structure which, contrary to SW, only requires partial certi…ability. Condition (a) will be the same in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Condition (b) will be the same in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
7 They assume that S observes N signals, each taking on one of two values, "high" or "low", and that S only can certi…ably disclose the realization of one signal. So, there are 2 N types while there only are 2N available messages. 8 Shin [22] considers two interested parties (a defendant and a plainti¤) whereas Shin [23] consider only one interested party (a …rm) and two decision makers (two shareholders). Boiling down to an S-R game, he assumes that S's preferences are monotonic in R's action and that R does not know whether S has or not perfectly observed the payo¤-relevant state (state of Nature), which is a given value in an interval. He assumes that S observes a randomly chosen interval containing the state of Nature and that he only can prove a larger interval than the one observed, but cannot prove that he has not observed a smaller one.
Existence
SW's Theorem 1 provides some su¢ cient conditions on (M ) to possess a separating equilibrium. Our …rst theorem generalizes such a result to a partial certi…ability setting and more general preferences. Denotes the bias function B(t) as a R (t) a S (t)
0 on . In this case, A1 and A2 imply that for every certi…able set T , T min is a wci. In the light of Proposition 1, a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium is that every type t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set for which he is a wct. That is, it su¢ ces that every type t is able to certify a set T for which T min = t. Of course, by substituting T min for T max when B( ) 0 on we obtain the result. The same reasoning holds if B( ) changes sign once on and B( min ) > 0. [18] , Milgrom and Roberts [19] ) a separating equilibrium would still exist under the weaker condition that the Sender rather can certify a subset for which his true type is minimum (resp. maximum) when his ideal action exceeds (resp. is exceeded by) the Receiver's one. The partial certi…ability of the games studied by Okuno-Fujiwara et al. [20] 10 and Lanzi and Mathis [15] 11 satisfy condition (b).
In the following, we shall need to identify the set of actions inciting to deviate from a separating strategy. That is the set of actions getting to type t a higher payo¤ than under action a R (t). When a R (t) < a S (t) (resp. a R (t) > a S (t)), writeã(t) as fa 2 Aja 6 = a R (t) and u S (a; t) = u S (a R (t); t)g when a is wellde…ned, andã(t) = +1 (resp.ã(t) = 1) otherwise. When a R (t) = a S (t), writeã(t) as a R (t). A2 implies thatã(t) is unique. Notice that if u S ( ; t) were symmetric round a S (t) thenã(t) = 2a S (t) a R (t).
Uniqueness
From now, we shall generalize SW's Theorem 3 which provides some su¢ cient conditions for every equilibrium to be separating. In addition to the premises of Theorem 1, assume that a R ( ) is strictly increasing in t on . So for any certi…able set T which is nonsingleton, whenever B( ) > 0 on T , type T min strictly prefers action a R (T min ) rather than a R (t) for all t in co(T )nfT min g, and so rather than any R's equilibrium response to a message certifying a set T . On the other hand, any R's equilibrium response to a message m 0 that certi…es a set T 0 with T 0 max = T min and a
, is an action a(m 0 ) that gets a higher (or equal) payo¤ to type T min , than does action a R (T min ). So if type T min can certify set T 0 , doing so always constitutes a pro…table unilateral deviation from certifying set T . A similar reasoning applies with type T max when B( ) < 0 on T . Thus, S's equilibrium strategy contains a pooling set of types sending the same message. Any equilibrium is then separating. As for Theorem 1, we shall show that the same reasoning holds if B( ) changes sign once on and B( min ) > 0.
Theorem 2. Suppose a R ( ) is strictly increasing in t on . If A1, A2 and:
10 They consider a game with multiple agents. They assume that each agent can send a message consisting of a set of truthful lower bounds for the signal he has observed. They show that if agents' payo¤s are positive-monotone in beliefs then every equilibrium is separating. 11 They consider a situation where R relies on the report of S prior to decide whether to undertake or not a certain project. The higher is the value of the observed state the more the state is conveying favorable information sustaining the project. Information contained in the report is partially veri…able in the sense that S can suppress favorable information but he cannot exaggerate it. They assume that con‡icting preferences only occur for medium state values. The ideal players'action for such values then identi…es the more eager agent for the project to be undertaken. In particular, they show that there is a separating equilibrium if and only if S is the more eager agent.
(a) B( ) does not change sign on , or B( ) changes sign once on and B( min ) > 0; and (b') Every type t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set T for which T min = t and a R (T max ) <ã(t) if B(t) < 0; T = ftg if B(t) = 0; and T max = t and a R (T min ) >ã(t) else, then every equilibrium of (M ) is separating.
Theorem 2 states in particular that in games where the Sender wants to maximize the magnitude of the Receiver's action (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty [8] , Grossman [12] , Grossman and Hart [13] , Koessler [14] , Matthews and Postlewaite [17] , Milgrom [18] , Milgrom and Roberts [19] , Okuno-Fujiwara et al. [20] , Shin [23] ), every equilibrium is separating whenever the Sender can certify a subset for which his true type is minimum (as with such preferences B(t) < 0 then impliesã(t) = +1).
Existence under more general preferences
Now, under A1 and A2 we shall provide su¢ cient conditions on (M ) that guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium even when players'preferences may fail the premises of Theorem 1 and 2, but satisfy a single-crossing property. The single-crossing property we use for a set T excludes the possibility that T contains any pair of types which strictly prefer to be misidenti…ed for another.
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Single-crossing property for set
Our next result will exploit the fact that if a type t can certify a set T that both satis…es the single-crossing property (Theorem 3 condition (a 1 )) and only contains types either for which t strictly prefers to be misidenti…ed or for which R's ideal action is the same (Theorem 3 condition (b 0 )), then t is a wct for T .
Rather than assuming the single-property for any pair of types, we only need to assume it for pair of types who have a common available message (Theorem 3 condition (a 1 )). (This distinction plays a role only if is not certi…able.) To establish the proof, we shall use an inductive argument on the number of sign changing of B( ) requiring that B( ) changes sign …nitely often on (Theorem 3 condition (a 2 )).
Theorem 3. If A1 and A2 then (M ) possesses a separating equilibrium if: (a 1 ) Every certi…able set satis…es the single-crossing property; and (a 2 ) B( ) changes sign …nitely often on ; and (b') Every type t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set T for which T min = t and a R (T max ) <ã(t) if B(t) < 0; T = ftg if B(t) = 0; and T max = t and a R (T min ) >ã(t) else.
Without condition (a 2 ) requiring that B( ) changes sign …nitely often on , our Theorem 3 would be the generalization of the SW's Theorem 2. 
As u S ( ; t) is symmetric round a S (t), on A we haveã(t) := 2a
) has a unique zero at t = (1 ) (if t = 2 (0; 1) then B( ) does not change sign on ). If 0 or + 1 then, from Theorem 1, there is a separating equilibrium if every t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set T satisfying: T max = t when (1 )t > ; and T min = t when (1 )t < . In addition, from Theorem 2, every equilibrium is separating if t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set T satisfying: T max = t and T min ã(t) when (1 )t > ; T = ftg when t = t ; and T min = t and T max ã(t) else. From Theorem 3, this latter condition ensures that there is a separating equilibrium when > 0, + < 1 and 1 ( < 1 would violate the single-crossing property for set ).
Applications
When an informed agent does not have the ability to certify all his private information we have shown that full revelation requires an additional condition: every type can separate from types that prefer to pool with him. This condition is strong. But the decision-maker (Receiver) may ask the informed party (Sender) to provide appropriate available documents so that this condition holds. Here are some applications.
A seller can ask a budget-constrained buyer to post a bond equal to his reported budget in order to prevent him from overstating it (see, e.g., Che and Gale [4] ). Traders in an exchange economy can be required to deposit collateral for each order preventing them from over-reporting their initial endowments (see, e.g., Forges et al. [10] ). Financial reporting companies can be compelled by legislation (see, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) to annually issue a statement identifying the framework used by management to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the company's internal control in order to prevent them from misleading investors. A court can ask a creditor declaring that a debtor paid him with a bounced check to present a bank notice stating that the debtor's check was returned due to insu¢ cient funds, otherwise giving weight to negative evidence (see, e.g., Bull and Watson [2] ). Consumers may turn toward eco-labeled products to prevent both industrial and agricultural sectors from withholding the environmental externalities associated with their production process (see, e.g., Cason and Gangadharan [3] ). Similarly, investors may turn toward issues that are underwritten by reputable investment banks to detect …rms that are signi…cantly less risky (see, e.g., Fang [6] ). A …rm hoping to appropriate an innovation may be compelled by the patent granting authority to present the new technical knowledge it possess (see, e.g., d'Aspremont et al. [1] ).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Formally, condition (ii) write as: there is an injection i from to M ( ) such that i(t) 2 M (t) and t 2 wct(T (i(t))). Su¢ ciency. Suppose (i) and (ii) hold. The following strategies constitute a separating equilibrium. Each type t sends i(t) (as considered in the formalization of (ii)), to which R responds with a R (t) (injection i ensures that separation holds). In addition, R responds to any message m with a R (t ), where t is a wci for T (m) ((i) =) wci(T (m)) 6 = ?); so no type would have an incentive to deviate. Necessity. Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that there is a separating equilibrium and either (i) or (ii) does not hold. First, suppose that (i) does not hold: there is a message m 2 M ( ) with wci(T (m)) = ?. Thus for each t 2 co(T (m)), there is t 2 T (m) such that u S (a R (t ); t) > u S (a R (t); t). Such a type t would has an incentive to deviate to m 2 M (t) as, by supposition his equilibrium message induces a R (t), a contradiction. Second, suppose that (ii) does not hold. If there is a type t 2 who sends a message m 2 M (t), certifying the set T (m) for which t is not a wct then, by de…nition, there is a type t
. Such a type t 0 would then has an incentive to send m 2 M (t 0 ), as by supposition his equilibrium message induces a R (t 0 ) while message m induces a R (t). If each type t sends i(t) (as considered in the formalization of (ii)), but i is not an injection from to M ( ) then there are two di¤erent types t 1 ; t 2 2 , with i(t 1 ) = i(t 2 ). So, R cannot distinguish between t 1 and t 2 .
Determining whether a set has a wci may not be straightforward. The use of the following lemma in the proof of Theorems 1 and 3 will allow us to simplify the problem. A2 implies that the set of actions that a type t strictly prefers to a R (t) write as the intersection between A and the open interval with endpoints a R (t) andã(t). By de…nition of a wci t for T , a R (t ) does not belong to this set of actions. Lemma 1 simply says that action a R (t ) is then out of the open interval with endpoints a R (t) andã(t).
Lemma 1. If A2, then an inference t for T is a wci for T if and only if for each t 2 T we have
Proof of Lemma 1. Necessity. Let t be a wci for T . By de…nition, a R (t ) 2 A and for every t 2 T , we have u S (a R (t ); t) u S (a R (t); t). Let t 2 T . Let us distinguish between three cases: Case 1 : a R (t) < a S (t). By A2 and by de…nition ofã(t), we …rstly have a R (t) < a S (t) <ã(t), and secondly either a R (t ) a R (t) = minfa R (t);ã(t)g or [ã(t) < +1 and a R (t ) ã(t) = maxfa R (t);ã(t)g]. Case 2 : a R (t) > a S (t). An analogous argument to Case 1 allows us to conclude. Case 3 : a R (t) = a S (t). By de…nition ofã(t), we have minfa R (t);ã(t)g = maxfa R (t);ã(t)g, which allows us to conclude. Su¢ ciency. Let t 2 T and t 2 co(T ). Suppose a R (t ) minfa R (t);ã(t)g. From a R (t ) 2 A which is a bounded set we obtainã(t) > 1. By de…nition ofã(t) and from A2, for every a 2 A, if a minfa R (t);ã(t)g then u S (a; t) u S (a R (t); t). In particular whenever a = a R (t ). An analogous argument allows us to conclude when a R (t ) maxfa R (t);ã(t)g.
Proof of Theorem 1. In order to establish existence of a separating equilibrium under A1, it su¢ ces to prove that Proposition 1 conditions (i) and (ii) hold. A2 will allow us to use Lemma 1. Let us …rst show that Proposition 1 condition (i) holds. Suppose (a). Fix a certi…able set T . If B( ) does not change sign on T then we either haveã(t)
That is, by Lemma 1, either T min or T max is a wct as under A1 a R ( ) is increasing in t on . If B( ) changes sign on T then there is an inference t 2 co(T ) such that a S (t ) = a R (t ), as A1 and A2 imply that B( ) is continuous in t on . From (a), such a t can be chosen such that there is no pair (t 0 ; t") with t 0 < t < t" satisfying B(t 0 ) < 0 < B(t"). Using Lemma 1, it is then easily checked that such a t is a wci for and hence for T . Therefore, Proposition 1 condition (i) holds. Now, let us show that condition (ii) holds. Fix a type t 2 . Let us distinguish between three cases: Case 1 : There is a type t 0 > t such that B(t 0 ) > 0. From (b), type t can certify a set T for which T max = t. By (a), for every t 00 < t, B(t 00 ) 0. Sõ a(t 00 ) a R (t 00 ) a R (T max ) = a R (t) as under A1 a R ( ) is increasing in t on . By Lemma 1, t is then a wct for T . Case 2 : There is a type t 0 < t such that B(t 0 ) < 0. By substituting T max for T min , a similar argument to Case 1 applies. Case 3 : There is neither t 0 > t such that B(t 0 ) > 0 nor t 0 < t such that B(t 0 ) < 0. Thus, for every t 0 > t we have a
;ã(t 0 )g. Also, for any type t 00 < t, we obtain a R (t) maxfa R (t 0 );ã(t 0 )g. Under A2, Lemma 1 allows us to assert that t is a wct for and then for any set he can certify. Consequently, every type can certify a set for which he is a wct. From (b), the possibly use of a di¤erent message to certify those sets implies Proposition 1 condition (ii) holds.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose contrary to the theorem, that T is a pooling set in some equilibrium. As we are studying pure equilibria, de…ne a R (T ) as arg max a2A R T u R (a; t)dp(t); under A1, a
Condition (a) implies that B(T min ) 0 or B(T max ) 0. So, whatever R's equilibrium strategy, under A2 type T min or T max would strictly prefer to deviate by certifying a set as de…ned in (b 0 ) over certifying T , a contradiction.
In the proof of Theorem 3, we shall use the following de…nitions. If B( ) changes sign …nitely often, we shall say that t (resp. t + ) is the …rst (resp. last) sign change on T if it is the minimal (resp. maximal) zero t of B( ) on T which is in a sign-changing interval in T , and such that [T min ; t] (resp. [t; T max ]) does not contain a sign-changing interval.
Proof of Theorem 3. As in the proof of Theorem 1, under A1 and A2 it su¢ ces to prove that the premises of Proposition 1 hold, using Lemma 1. We shall start by proving the following lemma to show that conditions (a 1 ) and (a 2 ) imply Proposition 1 condition (i).
Lemma 2. If A1 and A2 then any certi…able set satisfying the single-crossing property and on which B( ) changes sign …nitely often has a wci.
Proof of Lemma 2. We shall use the following inductive argument.
Inductive Hypothesis. If every compact interval satisfying the single-crossing property on which B( ) changes sign n times has a wci, then every compact interval satisfying the single-crossing property on which B( ) changes sign n + 1 times has a wci.
Proof. Let T be a compact interval which satis…es the single-crossing property. In the …rst part of the proof of Theorem 1 we have shown that if B( ) does not change sign on T then T has a wci. Let B( ) change sign n + 1 times on T . Let us set t (t + ) as the …rst (last) sign change on T . By de…ni-tion, B( ) changes sign n times on [t ; To conclude, notice that conditions (a 1 ) excludes the possibility that any certi…able set contains a pair of types strictly preferring to be misidenti…ed for another. While condition (b 0 ) states that every type can certify, by sending a di¤erent message, a set which only contains types inducing the same R's ideal action or for which he strictly prefers to be misidenti…ed. Therefore, conditions (a 1 ) and (b 0 ) imply Proposition 1 condition (ii).
